Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1980

Montana v. United States
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the
Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Montana v. United States. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 67. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

er 3/25/80

PRELIMINARY - MEMORANBBM
April 11, 1980 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 79-1128

Cert to CA9 (Sneed, Anderson,
D. Williams

[DJrr-

MONTANA, ET AL.

v.
UNITED STATES, ET AL!ederal/Civil
1. SBMMARY:

Timely per extn.

The questions are:

(A) Who owns the stretch

of the Big Horn River that flows within the boundaries of the Crow
~

-:

Indian Reservation? (B) What law defines the boundaries of
~ ··.·-

privately owned lands riparian to that part of the river? (C) May
.
.
the Crow Tribe prohibit non-member hunting and fishing within the
Reservation?
2. FACTS:

The Crow Tribe occupies a Reservation in

Montana comprising 2,282,764 acres.

These lands are part of a

2.
large area (some 38 million acres) that was defined as Crow
"territory" in the First Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1851. In 1868,
the Crow Tribe ceded about 30 milion acres of this territory to the
United States in a treaty which provided that the rest of the 1851
territory was "set apart for [the Crow Tribe's)

absolute and

undisturbed use and occupation" as their "permanent home." Second
Treaty of Fort Laramie, Art. 2, 4.
agree[d)

The

United States "solemnly

that no persons [other than authorized government agents]

shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the
territory described • •

"

Art. 2.

The 1868 Reservation was

bounded in part by the "mid-channel of the Yellowstone [River]."
The Big Horn ran within the boundaries of the Reservation from the
Montana-Wyoming border to its mouth at the Yellowstone. Both rivers

(

are navigable streams.
Although large chunks of land have been ceded to the
United States since 1868, a major stretch of the Big Horn still
runs through the center of the Reservation.

Under the Allotment

Acts of 1887 and 1920, the United States has issued patents
granting title ' to certain Reservation land to individual Indians.
Some of these lands were conveyed to non-Indians, and about 30% of
the Reservation is now owned by non-Indians in fee.

43% of

Reservation residents are non-Indians.
In 1973, the Crow Tribal Council adopted a resolution,
No. 74-05, prohibiting all hunting and fishing on the Reservation
except by members of the Tribe.

Montana continued to issue hunting

and fishing licenses purportedly valid on Crow lands, and to

(

declare open seasons in areas closed to such activities by the

3.
(

Tribe.

In 1974, the United States prosecuted a non-Indian for

violating 18

u.s.c.

§

1165* by fishing in the Big Horn while

standing on state-owned riparian land within the Reservation.

The

DC dismissed the complaint on the ground that Montana owned the Big
Horn.

The CA9 reversed,

gnited~tates - ~;-Finch,

548 F.2d 822, but

this Court vacated on double jeopardy grounds, remanding the case
with directions that the appeal be dismissed, 433
3.

P~OCEEDINGS - BELOW:

u.s.

677.

The present action was initiated by

the United · States in 1975 to parallel the Finch litigation. The
Crow Tribe intervened.

The complaints sought to quite title to the

Big Horn in the United States; to enjoin the State from regulating
non-Indian hunting and fishing within the Reservation; and a
declaration that the authority to regulate hunting and fishing is
vested solely in the Tribe and the United States.

The DC (Battin,

D.Mont.) agreed substantially with Montana, holding (1) that the
State owned the Big Horn to the high-water mark;

(2) that the State

has exclusive authcirity to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing
on the river and on non-Indian fee lands;

(3) that the United

States has concurrent authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing on tribal or Indian lands under 18

u.s.c.

§

1165; and (4)

that the Tribe has can only bar non-Indians from those lands
described in § 1165.

~ U.S.C.

§ 1165 provides: "Whoever, without lawful authority or
permission, willfully and knowingly goes upon any land that
belongs to any Indian or Indian tribe • • • and either are held
by the United States in trust or are subject to a restriction
against alienation imposed by the United States, or upon any
lands of the United States that are reserv ed for Indian use, for
the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing thereon, • • • shall
be [subject to criminal penalties]."

4.
The CA9 reversed.

Based on its Finch o p inion, th e CA

held that the United States holds trust title to the bed and banks
of the Big Horn river to the high-water mark.

The CA held that

Resolution 74-05 was "a valid exercise of tribal power," except
insofar as it barred non-member residents from hunting and fishing
on their own lands.

The CA also held that Montana has concurrent

authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing within the
Reservation for proper conservation and management purposes, as
long as it neither regulates Tribe members' hunting and fishing nor
impedes proper tribal regulations.
4. e0NTENTIONS:

(A) Montana first assails the CA's

conclusion that the bed of the Big Horn belongs to the Tribe.

This

is said to violate the Equal Footing Doctrine, under which new
States receive title to the beds of navigable rivers within their
territories upon admission to the Union. During the territorial
phase , the United States holds title in trust for the future State.
Montana concedes that the United States may grant title away before
stat e hood,* but. contends that the treaties with the Crow were not
"plain" enough, United · States - v; · Holt - State - Bank, 270
(1926), to show an intention to convey title.

u.s.

49, 55

Montana

distinguishes <.:hoctaw · Na1tion · v; - 0klahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), in
which the Court found a grant.
Washington and Idaho have filed an amicu s brief, r elying
on

~uyal!up ~ Tribe - v; - Washinqton - Game - D e p a rtm e nt,

~H'ont a na

433 U.S. 165

quotes from 0r e qon - v ·; - eorvalli s· Sand ·· &· Grave l - Co ; , 429
U.S. 363, 372-374 (1977), in wh1ch the Cou r t u se d language
sug gesting that th e United States could not conv ey title
at al l.
But Mo n ta n a does not seri o usly challenqe the rule t h at the
Un ited States may do s o "in c ase o f so~e international duty or
publ i c exig e ncy • • • " Shive ly - v; - Bowl by- , 152 u. s . 1, 49-50.

5.
(1977), which hel

that the Puyallup Tribe lost its right to use

the Puyallup River fishing grounds for its ''exclusive use" when it
alienated almost its entire reservation.

If all of the riparian

lands are privately owned, the rule of trust status for the river
bed creates a "legal Cheshire cat" - although the cat is gone, the
smile remains.

Amici ask why the smile of the Cheshire Cat remains

hanging over the Big Horn River when it ceases to hang over the
Puyallup.
The SG responds that this issue turns on the treaties and
history of each case.

The SG also defends the CA's conclusion that

a grant was intended. First, the river runs through the center of a
"permanent" reservation from which all non-members are excluded.
Second, the 1868 Treaty defined the Reservation as including half
of the navigable Yellowstone River.

Finally, the Crow Reservation

was carved out of aboriginal Crow land.

Thus, the river bed is

retained by the Crow unless ceded by them.
(B) Montana next contends that the CA erred in fixing the
boundary between the river and the riparian lands at the high-water
mark pursuant to the federal common law rule, ignoring contrary
Montana law.

Montana argues that federal law should borrow the

state rule in this case under Wilson · v; - 0maha - Tribe - of - Indians,
Nos. 78-160 & 161, June 29, 1979, because a uniform rule is
unnecessary.

The CA9 held that state law would frustrate the

"federal policy and functions" involved in determining the boundary
between a river that is held in trust for Indians and riparian
lands originally allotted solely to individual Indians.

The SG

adds that even streams owned by the States must be bounded

(

6.
according to uniform federal standards in order to preserve the
"equal footing" of the States that own them.
(C)

Montana renews her challenge to the validity of

Resolution No. 74-05.

The CA9 construed the Treaties to grant the

Tribe a right to control hunting and fishing. This Court has said
that the Tribe is more than a private owner, possessing "attributes
of sovereignty over both their members and their territory • • • • "
~ryited - States - v; · Wheeler

435

u.s.

313, 323 (1978).

The sovereignty
Olipha~

does not embrace criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,

-

v;-Suqamish
- Indian - Tribe, 435
.

u.s.

191

(1979), but theCA thought

it sufficient to permit reasonable civil regulation of non-Indians
on Reservation land.
Montana argues that Indian sovereignty does not extend to
lands owned by non-Indians in fee under Oliphant and 18

(.

1165.

u.s.c.

§

Congress is said to have enacted§ 1165 in part because

Indians did not have the protection of any law which gave them
control over their lands.

The SG responds that Oliphant dealt

solely with criminal cases, and that this Court has upheld the
right of reservation Indians to engage in civil regulation. See
Williams · v; - Lee, 358

u.s.

217, 223 (1959). TheCA invalidated the

Regulation as applied to residents hunting and fishing on their own
land, and specifically preserved the State's power to regulate nonIndian hunting and fishing on the reservation. This was a
reasonable accommodation.
Montana also contends that the Regulation is so arbitrary
as to "shock the conscience" and to constitute a taking under the
Fifth Amendment; and that it deprives non-Indian non-residents of

.

7.
equal protection in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25

u.s.c.

§

1302(8}.

Resp Crow Tribe answers that people who choose

to live on a reservation must be prepared to accept a reasonable
Indian regulation.

Moreover, the CA9 · concluded in ·Fisher that the

Regulation was a reasonable response to serious depletion of fish
and game. Finally, Montana says that the CA ignored the DC's
findings of fact in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a}. Montana
does not, however, identify specifically any such findings.
5. DISCUSSION:
close call.

The question of river bed ownership is a

The difficulty raised by amici Washington and Idaho

regarding the "Cheshire eat's smile" is particularly puzzling.

The

CA9 appears to have applied the governing law correctly, however,
and its ruling turns on the construction of particular treaties.
The questions raised by reservations where the majority of the land
has lost its trust status and all that remains is the "smile" would
be better addressed in a case that presents it.
The other questions appear to have been resolved
correctly.

No,rth - earol ixna - ~i ldl i fe ··.Resources - Comm 1 n - v; ·· E.';ts~._erp_

B~nd - of - Cherokee,

No. 78-1653, which is presently being held for

No. 78-630, Confederated ·Tribes, raises related issues regarding
~--------~----

concurrent state and Indian fishing regulations.

The CA9

distinguished the North - Carolina case, however, and no disposition
of that case seems likely to affect the result in this one.

Nor is

the Court's decision in Confederated - Tribes likely shed any light
on these issues.

It does not seem necessary to hold this case.

There are two responses.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Peter Byrne

DATE:

December 2, 1980

RE:

No. 79-1128, Montana v. United States

Questions Presented
1) Did the United States by treaty convey to the Crow
Tribe

the

bed

of

a

navigable

river

which

runs

through

the

reservation established by the treaties?
2)

Does state or federal law determine the riparian

rights on a navigable river?
3)

May an Indian tribe regulate hunting and fishing

by non-Indians on fee patented lands held by non-Indians within
the external borders of the reservation?
.........., ..
I.

This case arises out of a dispute between the Crow
Tribe and the state over
hunt

and

fish

within

the extent to which non-Indians may
hte

external

broders

of

the

Crow

2.

reservation. The Crows'

claim to their reservation dates from

The First Treaty fo Fort Laramie of 1851, which confirmed to
them

some

38

million

acres

of

land,

watershed of the Big Horn River.

the west led to the Second
which

the Tribe ceded

including

the

e

The growth of settlement

_T~~ty ~ Fo~ Lar~ie

all

entire

but 8 million acres,

in
by

formally

set

apart as their "permanent horne." The Treaty guaranteed the Crow
the "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the land,
and the United States promised to permit no persons other than
government agents or the Tribe's invitees "to pass over, settle
upon,

or

reduced

res ide
the

size

in"

the

reservation.

Subsequent

of

the

reservation

to

Pursuant to two "Allotment Acts",

2.3

legislation

million

acres.

28% of the land within was

~..Jl..

patented and conveyed to non-Indian indiviuals.
A large

stretch

of

.:z¥%

-1-o

the Big Horn River,

a

'h.dk-

navigable ~

river, flows through the reservation. In the 1950's the United
States built the Yellowtail Darn on the southerly portion of the
Big Horn River, condemning reservation lands.
the creation of thriving trout fishery

This action led

in the river. This in

turn led to an influx of fishermen, the great majority of
non Indian.

Concerned , the

Tribe

passed

--

forbidding non-Indians to hunt or fish on the

a

~

resolution

rese~vation.

This case was initiated by the United States, which
filed an action in the DC seeking a declaratory judgment that
it

h~ e

~ the

bed

within the reservation for
the Tribe
.....

and

banks

of

the benefit of

--- _______

the

B ~ rn

the Crow,

~L::f'

~

River ~

and

that ~

and "(~
-------------------------------

enjoys exclusive authority to regulate hunting
....
..........
---...........

._.~

LL-~-

3.

fishing

within

the

u.s.c.

action under 18
filed

in

the

reservation.

same

DC

tresspassed

in

F.Supp.

(D.Mont.

205

§1165

the

a

Horn,

1975).

a

criminal

(trespass on Indian property) was

against

Big

Simultaneously,

fisherman
United

who

States

The DC dismissed

allegedly
v.

the

Finch,

had
395

prosecution

becaue it ruled that the bed of the Big Horn belonged to the
state.

CA9

reversed,

beloned

to

the

(1976).

This

holding

u.s.

Court

in

that

trust

the

for

reversed

bed

the

of

the

Big

Tribe.

548

F.2d

summarily

on

double

Horn
822

jeopardy

grounds without reaching the question of who owned the River.
This present case then proceeded.
The DC held again that the state owned the riverbed
and

banks.

It

also

held

that

the

State

had

exclusive

jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing on the non-Indian
lands within the reservation,
to

hunt

and

fish

is

that the Crew's exclusive right

confined

to

Indian

lands

within

the

reservation, and their right to regulate hunting and fishing on
the reservation is limted to the right to prohibit non-Indians
from trespassing on Indian lands.
The CA reversed
ruling

that

riverbed.

the

Crow

in part.

were

the

It adhered
beneficial

to its earlier
owners

of

the

The court held that the Tribe can prohibit all nonI(

•

lands '\ within

the

----~------'----------------'-----------------------------reservation.
But the Tribe cannot prohibit non-Indians

from

Indian

hunting

and

fishing

on

Ind1an

...,.

hunting

and

reservation,

fishing

on

although

they

nondiscriminatory

their
can

conservation

own

fee

subject
measures.

lands
them

to

Finally,

within

the

reasonable,
the

court

C! /} #'f

4.

held that the state may regulate, concurrently with the Tribe,
non_Indian

hunting

and

fishing

on

Indian

lands,

so

long

as

state regulation do not interfere with tribal regulations. The
CA' s

opinion

is marked

by a

pragmatic

concern

with

securing

appropriate rights and dutioes for all concerned.

II
The first
inter e ~t

States

issue pres &

ed is who owns the benficial

in the bed of the Big Horn River.
conveyed

the

bed

to

the

Tribe

Unless

before

c9 #=- /

the United
Montana

was

admitted as a state to the union, the bed passed from the U.S.
to the state under the Equal Footing doctrine. Congress could
have ceded the bed of the navigiable river to the Tribe before

u.s.~JtcA

the state was admitted. Chocktaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397
620 (1970). Petr's contrary argument has no merit. The
is

whether

Tribe.
not

Id.

Congress

intended

to

convey

the

riverbed

the

river

explicitly

except

when

do ~~""'L-'

describing

boundaries. Fathoming the intent behind these treaties

cy ~

involv~~,.~
~~~

the application of traditional canons of construction

__.., _

G:at.t::~ cr~

~

in this area.
On

the

one

hand,

"disposals

by

the

Uni teed

4-¥---<a_:;.."-

/-..,_~/2 nu.._~
Stat ~

~~to
during the territorial period are not to be lightly inferred,

~~?

and should not be regarded as intended unless the intention was
definitely
States

.

the ~

to

at 633. The treaties involved are unclear, they

refer

gauging

T~

question ~~

v.

declared

or

otherwise

Holt State Bank,

270

made

u.s.

49,

very
55

plain."
(1926).

United
In

that

case, the Court held that the U.S. had not conveyed a navigable

5.

lake

to

a

relating

tribe,

to the

finding

nothing

in

the

relevent

treaties

lake nor even confirming Indian ownership of

reservation land. Also significant, perhaps, was the fact that
at the time of the litigation, the tribe had sold off all the
land in the vicintiy of the lake, so that it could no longer be
part of

the

Indian domain.

Cf.

Dep't, 433 U.S. 165, 173-74
to 22 acres,

Puyallup Tribe v.

Wash.

Game

(1977) (when reservation diminished

none of it riparian,

had exclusive right to fish

implausible that tribe ever

in river).

In any event,

the SG

presses this latter argument in an attempt to distinguish Holt.
On the other hand, Choctaw Nation evinces a much more
sympathetic approach

to examining intent to convey riverbeds.

This attitude sterns from the rules that Indian treaties are to
interpreted in light of how the Indians would have understood
its provisions, and that ambiguities are are to be resolved in
favor of the Indians. Choctaw Nation involved a treaty between
the U.S.

and various tribes, by which the tribes resettled on

land in Oklahoma in exchanges for quitting their lands farther
east.
the

The Court held
bed

of

the

that Congress had conveyed to the tribe

Arkansas

River

that

passed

through

the

reservation, notwithstanding the fact that the treaties did not
mention

the

thought

that when the

should

also

therein,
Moreover,

river

be

when
the

except

to

riverbeds

Court

regards

boundaries.

The

Court

treaty conveyed land to the tribes,

understood
the

as

thought

include
were
that

not

the

beds

expressly

retention

of

of

it

rivers

excluded.
the

bed

conflicted with promises in the treaty that the Indians would

6.

have "virtually complete sovereignty" over the reservation and,
that the

reservation would never

be embraced within a

state.

Finally, description of the boundaries of the reservation spoke
of drawing the line down the center of the main channel of the
river,
half

implying that at the boundary the tribes would receive

the bed.

The dissent

rule of Holt

that

in that case adhered

since ownership of

to

the older

the beds of naivigable

rivers is an incident of sovereignty, conveyence should not be
implied absent stong evidence.
In
admitted

that

somewhere
supra.
the

applying
the

between

these

principles

question
Holt

and

was

to

close,

Choctaw

this

the

case,

facts

u.s.

Nation.

Crow

were

hostilities~

conducted

as

an

affair

of

falling

v.

The court noted that negotations between the
state

CA9

Finch,

u.s.

and

to

end

It recognized that it had been held that the 1951

Treaty had confirmed the Indians as owners of the reservation
1

and, based primarily on assurences given to the Crow that the

terri tory

was

"your

United

States,

looked

to

the

284

country"
F.2d

solemn

361

and

"your

(Ct.Cl.

assurence

land".

1960).

given

Crow Tribe
The

the Tribe

court
in

Treaty that unvited outsiders would be excluded and
land was for

the

v.

also
1868

that the

the "absolute and undisturbed use and ocupation"

of the Tribe. The court thus concluded that that the Big Horn
was within the metes and bounds of granted land and went to the
Tribe

with

follows
is

the

land.

It

should

be

noted

that

this

holding

the Choctaw Nation analysis that if a navigible river

within

the

boundaries

of

land

granted

to

a

tribe

in

a

7.

treaty,

then

it will

be presumed

granted. As mentioned above,

that

the

riverbed was also

the issue presented turns on the

vitaltiy of this presumption.
In
treaty

my

is an

against

view,

this

analysis

undertaking with

implying

grants of

a

is

correct.

political

An

enitity.

naivigable waterways

Indian

The

rule

rests on the

principle that ownership of such waterways is an attribute of
sovereignty, and that conveyence of them to private individuals
is

so

unsual

that

a

court

should

not

presume

that

this

has

occurred. However, when the United States provided Indians with

jurisdictional

rights.

There

nothing

seems

untoward

in

believing that beneficial ownership of riverbeds is consistent
with the status of an Indian tribe.

Use of the water and its

other resources could be important for
When thee

fact~

the life of the tribe.

are viewed in ligh1-of the rule that treaaeties

are to be read as the Indians would have understood them,
presumption

created

in

Choctaw

Nation

makes

sense.

the

Thus,

I )

would hold that Crow received beneficial ownership of the bed

The strongest argument against this holding is
the Crow Treaties never promised that the territory given
be

embraced

within

a

state.

This

promise

that ~

woul·~~

implies

the

United States would not give a riverbed away to a future state.
Here,

no

however,

similar

promise

:;::;:;'

~

o f the Big Horn River.

never

?..-t:.~

was

made.

I

discount

this

factor,

because the Choctaw Nation Court made little out of

8.

this

promise,

but

concentrated

on

whether

the

riverbed

was

contained within the metes and bounds of the granted territory.

~The
riverbed.
h~

question remains whether the Crow still own the

In Puyallup, the Court considered an Indian claim to

able to fish free of state control in a non-navigable river

within

the

reservation,

based

upon

a

Treaty clause

granting

them exclusive right to use the reservation. The Court

~

rejecte~?

the claim in that case because the tribe had alienated all but
22

acres

land,

of

its

extensive

reservation

and

all

its

riparian

indicating that the claim to exclusive use of the river

had no factual basis. 433

u.s.

at 174. In a footnote, the Court

rejected the suggestion that the tribe retained trust ownership
of the riverbed as unsupported by the record. Id. n.l2.
although

the

tribe

retains

70%

of

the

reservation,

Here,
it

has

~-------------------

.......

alienated

all but

40

acres of

its

riparian land.

Amicus the

State of Washington argue on the stregnth of Puyallup that the

~D ~

Crow sale of adjacent riparian land extinguished their claim to ~
the

~~

riverbed.

never

owned

Petrs argue that the sales show that the Tribe
the

riverbed.

The

Crow

answer

that

~

Puyallup

contains little analysis and that the question of ownership of
the riverbed in that case was not before the Court. Moreoever,
in that case there was a question of whether
was
here.

still

in

Finally,

unallotted

existance,
the

lands

which

Allotment
chiefly

is

Act

the

emphatically
reserves

valuable

for

to

not
the

water

description obviously encompassing the Big Horn.

reservation
the

case

Tribe
power,

any
a

(

.'

9.

I

find

this

/~

question

extremely difficult.

states the problem, but is not helpful

Puyallup

in its resolution.

It

seems to have viewed the subsequent sales as negating the idea
that the tribe ever had the exclusive right it claimed. There
is

no

other

Tentatively,

law
I

cited.
would

The

CA did

hold

that

not discuss

so

long

reservation retains substantial terri tor ial
it still contains some
riverbed

riparian

is not dissolved.

I

land,

this

as

the

issue.
Tribe's

integrity and afld.

then ownership of

the

view ownership of the bed of a

navigable river as a special category of property tied to the
tribe's

quasi-sovereign status,

so that dismemberment of

the

reservation or mass sale of riparian land would dissolve

the

---

-

ownersip right. Here, however, the Tribe continues to function
'

on the reservation and retains access to the river.

III
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over

owners take upland to the highwater or
Big Horn.
argues

The dispute
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that the state rule,

the

whether
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lowwater marks of
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u.s.
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(1979).
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u.s.

-~

Lu::l!::4..,k.,l-

~
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law to
and

:Sk,.ztft..
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rule as the federal law. The application of this principle to
navigable waters depends on State Land Board v. Corvallis Land
Gravel Co.,

&

the

State's

u.s.

363

(1977), where the Court held that

ownership

of

the

440

bed

of

a

navigiable

water

supported thP application of state law to determine the extent
of riparian holdings.
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applicable
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state,

the

that neither Wilson nor Corvallis
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is
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The
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Pollard's Lessee v.

first
by
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3 How.
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interest
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of
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States
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instance. Please note that

it is decided that the state does own the riverbed, then it is
plain that state law governs riparian holdings.
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from
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and

fishing

on
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------------~
~- ~
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the more restrictive of the

the ,non-memeber
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two rules. This in effect
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allows ~~

q __
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parties, I

extensively rehearsing the positions of the

agree with theCA that the tribe retains the

authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-memebers.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 100 S.Ct.

In
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(1980), the Court held that the tribe there retained the power
to tax non-members for transactions occurring on trust lands as
"a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain
unless divested of it by fderal law or necessary implication of
their

dependent

status."

Regulating

hunting

and

fishing

are

even more central to the interests of the tribe than taxing, as
is indicated by the hunting rights granted them under the 1868
Treaty.
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hunting and fishing rights over the land when it conveyed the
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that
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right

to
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In
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view,
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regulate

hunting
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fishing by non-residents within the
to who owns
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consistent with the notion of a limited Indian sovereignty and
allows the Tribe to protect its most precious group asset, its
~
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State of Montana, et al.,
Petitioners
On Writ of Ce. rtiOrari to the
v
'
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.
U m'ted Sta'tes, e t a 1.
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A _

[February - , 1981]
JusTICE STEWART delivered the opi11ion of the Court.
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/)ALl./
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~

t!r{~tl

This case concerns the sources and ~cope of the power of an
Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by nonIndians. Relying on its purported ownership of the bed of
the Big Horn River, on the treaties which created its reservation. and on its inherent power as a sovereign, the Crow Tribe
of Montana claims the authority to prohibit all hunting and
fishing by non-members of the Tribe on non-Indian property
within reservation boundaries. We granted certiorari, Q } 1J
lT. S. - , to review a decision of the United States Court of / ~
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that substantially upheld this )?__~~_ A ~~
claim.
/ ~ ....-,....-~

I.e~

The Crow Indians originated
][ in Canada, but some three
centuries ago they migrated to what i~ now southern Montana. In the 19th century, warfare between the Crows and
several other tribes led the tribes and the United • tates to
sign the First Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851, 11 Stat. 749,
in which the signatory tribes acknowledged various designated lands as their respective territories. The treaty identified approximately 38.5 million acres as Crow territory and,
in Article 5, specified that, by making the treaty, the tribes
did not "surrender the privilege of huuting, fishing, or pass-

~

..
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ing over" any of the lands in dispute. In 1868, the Second
Treaty of Fort Laramie established a Crow reservation of
roughly 8 million acres, including land through which the
Big Hom River flows. 15 Stat. 649. By Article 2 of the
treaty, the United States agreed that the res::rvation "shall
be set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the Crow Tribe, and that no non-Indians except
agents of the Government "shall ever be permitted to pass
over, settle upon, or reside in " the reservation.
Several subsequent Acts of Congress reduceu the reservation to slightly fewer than 2.3 million acres. See 22 Stat. 42
(18£2); 26 Stat. 1039-40; 33 Stat. 3fi2 (1904); 50 Stat. 884
(1937). In addition, the General Allotment Act of 1887. ch.
119, 24 Stat. 388, and the Crow Allotment Act of 19~0, ch.
224, 41 Stat. 751, authorized the issnance of patents in fee
to individual Indian allottees within the reservation. Under
these Acts, an allottee could alienate his land to a non-Indian
after holdiug it for 25 years. Today, roughly 52 p er ~ ent of
the reservation is allotted to members of the Tribe and held
by the United States in trust for them, 17 percent is held in
trust for the Tribe itself, and approximatdy 28 percent is
held in fee by non-Indians. The State of Montana owns in
fee simple 2 percent of the reservation, the United Stat"s
lesr. than 1 percent.
S'nce the 1920's, the State of Montana has storked the
waters of the reservation with fish. anu the construction of a
dam by the United States made trout fishing in the Big Horn
River possible. The reservation also contains game, some of
it stocked by the State. Since the 1950's, the Crow Tribal
Council has passed several resolutions respecting hunting and
fishing on the reservation, incluuing Resolution No. 74- 05. the
occasio11 for this lawsuit. That resolHtiou prohibits hunting
and fishing within the reservation by anyone who is not a
member of the Tribe. The State of Montana, however. has
continued to assert its authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indian::; within the reservEttion .

•
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On October 9, 1975, proceeding in its own r;ght a11d as
fiduciary for the Tribe, the United States endeavored to resolve the couflict between the Tribe and the State by filing
the present lawsuit. The plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory
judgn1ent quieting title to the bed of the Big Horn River in
the United States as trustee for the Tribe, (2) a declaratory
judgment establishing that the Tribe and the United States
have sole authority to regulate hunting and fishing within
the reservation, and (3) an injunction requ:ring Montana to
secure the permiEs~on of the Tribe before issuing hunting or
fishing licenses for use within the reservation.
The D istrict Court denied the relief sought. United States
v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599. In determining the ownership of the river, the court invoked the presumption that the
United States does not intend to diveRt itself of its sovereign
rights in navigable waters and reasoned that here, as in
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, the language
and circumstances of the relevant treaties were insufficieut
to rebut the presumption. The court thus concluded that
the bed and banks of the river had remained in the ownership of the United States until they passed to Montana on
its admission to the Union. As to the dispute over the regu~
lation of hunting and fishing. the court found that "[i]mplicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Oliphant [v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191,] is the recognition
that Indian tribes do not have the power, nor do they have
the author<ty , to regulate nou·-Iudians unless so granted by
an Act of Congress." 457 F. Supp .. at 609. Because no
treaty or Art of Congress gave the Tribe authority to regulate
hunting or fishing by non-Indians, the court held that the
Tribe could not exercise such authority except by granting or
withholding authority to trespass on tribal or Indian land.
All other authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishin~~: resided concurrently in the State of Montana and, under
18 ·(T. S. C . § 1165 ( \\ hich mahs it a federal offense to tres...
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pass on Indian land to hunt or fish without permission), the
United States.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court. 604 F. 2d 1162. Relying on its opinion in
United States v. Finch, 548 F. 2d 822, vacated on other
grounds, 433 U. S. 676, the appellatr court held that, pursuant to the treaty of 1868, the bed and banks of the river
were held by the United States in trust for the Tribe. Relying on the treaties of 1851 and 1868, the court held that the
Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation by non-members, although the court noted that the
Tribe could not impose criminal sanctions on those nonmembers. The court also held, however, that the two Allotment Acts implicitly deprived the Tribe of the authority to
prohibit hunting and fishing on fee lands by resident nonmember owners of those lands. Finally, the court held that
non-members permitted · by the Tribe to hunt or fish within
the reservation remained subject to Montana's fish and game
laws.
II
The respondents seek to establish a substantial part of their
claim of power to control hunting and fishing on the reservation by asking us to recognize their title to the bed of the
Big Horn River. 1 · The question is whether the United States
1 According to the respondents, ihe Crow Tribe',; interest in restricting
hunting and fishing on the rese1vation foeu:>e;,. almost entirPly on sports
fishing and duck hunting In the waters and 011 the surface of the Big Horn
River. The parties, the bistrirt Cour1, and the Court. of Appeals have all
assumed that owmrship of the riverbed will largPiy detennine the power
to control these artivitie . The link betwec•n uwner::;hip of the bed and
control over fishing finds some implicit :mJlport in early decision:; of this
Court. E. g., Shively v. BO'wlby, 152 U.S. 1, 17, 49; Mar-t1:n v. Waddell,
41 U. S. M7, 408-410. Moreovrr, ns a matter of common hlw, casting
a fibbing line and lure from tl1e riverbank is a tresvass on the riverbed.
W. Prosser, Handbook of the La.w of Tort~, § 13, at 69.
Although the complaint in thi~:~ ca~e sought to quiet title only to the bed
of the Big Horn River, we nole the eoncession uf the United States that
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~onveyed beneficial ownership of thf' riverbed to the Crow
Tribe by the Treaties of 1851 or 1868, and therefore continues to hold the land in trust for the use and benefit of the
Tribe, or whether the United States retained ownership of
the riverbed as public land which then passed to the State
of Montana upon its admission to the Union. Choctaw Nat-ion v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620, (:)27-628.
Though the owners of land rip1u·ian to non-navigable
streams may own the adjacent riverbed, conveyance by the
United States of land riparian to a navigable river carries no
interest in the riverbed. Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 672;
Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 289; 33 U.S. C.§ 10;
43 U. S. C. § 931. Rather, the ownership of laud under navigable waters is an an incident of sovereignty. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 409-411. As a general principle, the Federal
Government holds such lands in trust for future States, to be
granted to such States when they enter the Union and assume
sovereignty on an "equal footing" with the established States.
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 212, 222-223, 229. After
a State enters the Union, title to the land is governed by state
law. The State's power over the beds of navigable waters
remains subject to only one limitation: the paramount power
of the United States to ensure that such waters remain free
to interstate and foreign commerce. United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 14. It is now established, however, that
Congress may sometimes convey lands below the high water
mark of a navigable water,
and so defeat the title of a new State, in order to perform international obligations, or to effect an improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience
of commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States, or to carry out other public purposes for which
the United States hold the Territory.

if the bed of the 1'iver passed to Montana upon its admission to the Union,
the State at the same time acquired ownership of the banks of the river
as well •.
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Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48. But because control
over the property underlying navigable waters is so stro11gly
identified with the sovereign power of government, United
States v. Oregon, supra, 295 U. S., at 14, it will not be held
that the United ·states has conveyed such land "except because of some special duty or exigency." United States v.
Holt State Bank, Sltpra, 270 U. S., at 55. See also Shively
v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48. A court deciding a question of title to the bed of a navigable water must, therefore,
begin with a strong presumption against conveyance by the
United States, United States v. Oregon, supra, 295 U. S., at 14,
and must not infer such a conveyance "unless the illteution
was definitely declared or otherwise made plain," United
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55, or was
rendered "in clear and special words," Martin v. Waddell,
wpra, 41 U. S., at 411, or "unless the claim confirmed in terms
embraces the land under the waters of the stream," Packer v.
Bird, supra, 137 U. S., at 672. 2
In United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, this Court applied these principles to reject an Indiau tribe's claim of title
to the bed of a navigable lake. The lake lay wholly within
the boundaries of the Red Lake Indian reservation, which
had been created by treaties entered into before Minnesota
joined the Union . In these treaties the United States promised to "set apart and withheld from sale, for the use of" the
Chippewas, a large tract of land, Treaty of Sept. 30, 1854, 10
Stat. 1109, and to convey "a sufficient quantity of land for
the pen'nanent homes" of the Indians. Treaty of Feb. 22,
1855, 10 Stat. 1165. See Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S.
373, 389. 3 The Court concluded that there was nothing in
2 Congress was, of course, aware of this presumption once it was e~;tab
lishcd by this Court. Ser Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584,
S88.
3 The Hitchcock decision expressly stated that the Red Lake rr~;erva
tion was "a reservation within the accepted meanmg of that term.))·
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 389,
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the treaties "which even approaches a gTant of rights in lanc.ls
underlying navigable waters; nor anything evincing a purpose to depart from the established policy * * * of treating
such lands as held for the benefit of the future StatP."
United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 58-59.
Rather, "[t]he effect of what was done was to reserve in a,
general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what
remained of their aboriginal territory." I d., at 58.
The Crow treaties in this case, like the Chippewa treaties
in Holt State Bank, fail to overcome the estabiished pr•ei!Umption that the beds of navigabie waters remain in trust
for future States and pass to the ne•N States when they as~
~;ume sovereignty. The 1851 treaty did not by its terms formally con vcy any land to the 1nui:ms at ail. but instead
chiefly represented a covenant among several tribes which
recognized specific boundaries for their respective territories.
Treaty of Fort Laramie, 1851, 11 Stat. 749, Art. 5. It referred to hunting and fishing oniy insofar as it said that the
Crow Indians "do not surrender the priviiege of hunting,
fishing, or passing over any of the tracts of cou11try heretofore described," a statement that had uo bearing 011 ownerlihip of the riverbed. By contrast, the 1868 treaty did expressly convey land to the Cro_'Y 1.~ribe .. Articie 2 of the
treaty described the reservation land in detail ' and stated
that such land would be "set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein
named . . . ." Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1968,
15 Stat. 649, Art. 2. The treaty then stated:
'"[C]ommrneiug where the 107th degrt•e of lougitut!e west uf Greenwich crosses the south boundary of Montana Territory; thence north
along said 107th meridum to the mid-ehamwl of tht- Yellow~tone River;
t!Jence up said mid-channd of the Yellowstone lo the point where it
trokses the said southern boLmdary of Monlmw , bt>ing Lht> 45th degree of
north latitude; aflll lhem~e ea,.;l :~long said par:tllel of latitude to the place
of beginning ....;' Srcond TrPaty of Fori Laramie, l\Iay 7, 1868, 15 Sta\.

849,

Nrt.

2.
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the United States now solemnly agrees that no
persons, except those herein designated and authorized
to do so, and except such officers, agents, and employees
of the Government as may be authorized to enter upon
Indian reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by
law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon,
or reside in the territory described in this article for the
use of said Indians ....
Ibid. Whatever property rights the language of the 1868
treaty created, however, its language is not strong enough to
overcome the presumption against the sovereign's conveyance
of the riverbed. The treaty in no wa:v expreesly referred to
the riverbed, Packer v. Bird, supra, 137 U. S., at 672. nor was
an intention to convey the riverbed expressed in "clear and
special words," Martin v. Waddell, supra, 41 U. S., at 411,
or "definitely deelared or otherwise made plain," United
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55. Rather,
as in Holt, "the effect of wha.t was done was to reserve in a
general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what
remained of their aboriginal territory." Ibid.
Though Article 2 gave the Crow Indians the sole right to
use and occupy the reserved land, ancf implicitly, the power
to exclude others from it, the respondents' reliance on that
provision simply begs the question of the precise extent of
the conveyed lands to which this exr.lueivity attaches. The
mere fact that the bed of a navigable water lies within the
boundaries described in the treaty dons uot make the riverbed
part of the conveyed land, especially when there is no express refere11ce to the riverbed that might overcome the pr:--sumption against its conveyance. In the Court of Appeals'
F'i nch decision. on which recognition of the Crow Tribe's title
to the riverbed rested in this case, that court construed the
language of exclusively in the 1868 treaty as granting to the
Indians all the lands, includiug the riverbed, within the deiCribed boundaries. United States v. Finch , supm, 548 F. 2d,

·I
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at 829. Such a construction, however, cannot survive examination. As the Court of Appeals recognized, ibid., and
as the rE-spondents concede, the United States retains a navigational easement in the navigable waters lying within the
described boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless
of who owns the riverbed. Therefore, such phrases in the
1R68 trraty as "absolute and undist1:rbed use and occupation" and "no persons except those designated herein ... shall
ever be permitted." whatever they Reem to meau literally,
do not give the Indians the exclusive right to occupy all the
territory within the described boundaries. Thus, even 1f ex·
clusivity were the same as ownership, the treaty language
establishing this "r:gbt of exclusivity'' could not have the
meaning that the Court of Appeals ascnbed to it.·
sIn onE' recE-nt. case, Choctaw Nat£on v. Ol:lahmna. supra, thb Court
did con~true a reservation grant a~ includirg tlw bed of a navigab'e water,
and the re!;ponclent:; argue that this ca~l' re::;err.bles Choctaw Nation more
than it rr::;embles the establi::;hed !me or CGI<!E'S to which Choctaw Nation
is a singular exception. But. the finding of a conveyance of the riverbed
in Choctaw Nation was based on very peculiar circum:stanec~ not present
in this case.
Tho:se circumstances aro:;e from the umtsual hi~tory of the treaties there
at issue, a history which fmmed an import:mt basis of the deci:;=on .
Chocta·w Nation v. Oklahoma, supra. 397 U.S, at 622-628 . Immediately
after the Revolutionary War, the Unit~d States had t>:gned treaties of
peace a.nd protection with the Cherokee :md Choctaw tribe;;, re;;erving
them land:; in Georgia and Missi&"llippi. In 3ucceeding years, the United
State:; bought large areas of land from the lndiam; to make room for
white :;ettlers who were encroa-ching on tribal lands, but the Government
signed new treaties guaranteeing that the Indians could live in peace on
tho:;e lands not ceded. The United State::; ::10011 betrayed that promise .
It proposed that the tribes be relocated in a newly acquired part of the
Arkansu:s Territory, but the new territory was ~;oo11 overrun by white settlers, and through t L ~erie::; of new cession agn'ements the Indians were
forced to relocate farther and farther webt . Ultimately, mo:;t of the
tribe:;' member:; refused t.o lea,ve their ea~tern land::;, doubting the reliability of the government':; promise;; of the new Wl'<Jtern land, but Georgia
and Mississip]>i, anxious for the relocation wt>stwurd so they rould a::;:sert
jurisdie~ion over the Indian !ami~ , p~trportrd to abolish the tribes an4
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Moreover, even though the establishment of an Indian
tribe can be an "appropriate public purpose" within the
meaning of Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48, justifying a congressional conveyance of a riverbed, see, e. g.,
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S., 85, the
situation of the Crow Indians at the time of the treaties
presented no "public exigency" which would have required
Congress to depart from its policy of reserving owenrship of
beds under navigable waters for the future States. See
Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48. As the record in
this case shows. at the time of the treaty the Crows were a
nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on buffalo, and fishing was
not important to their diet or way of life. JA 74. Cf.,
Alaska Padfic Fisheries v. United States, supra, at 88: Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F. 2d 295, 212 (CA9).
Finally, the United States has been fully able to carry out
distribute thl:' tribal lands. The Choctawt; and Cherokees finally signed
new trl:'aties with the United States aimed at rectifying their past sufl.'l:'ring at the haPd:s of the Federal Government and the Stateo;.
Under the Choctaw treat~· , the United St<tte:s promised to convey new
lands we:st of the Arkano;as territory in fee simple, and also pledged that
"no Territory or government shall ever have a right to pas:; law~ for the
government of tl1e Choctaw Nation . . . and that no part of the land
granted to tlwm ~hall "ver be embraced in any Territory or State." Treaty
of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 17, lc30, 7 Stat . 333-334, quoted in
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma. supra, 397 U. S., at. 625. In 1835, the
Cherokees signed a treaty containing ::>imilar provisions granting reservation landiS in fee ~imple and promi~ing that the tribal lands would not
become part. of any State or Territory. ld. , af 626. In concludmg that
the United States had intended to convey the riverbed to the tribe~:> before the admis:;ion of Oklahoma to the Union, the Choctaw court relied
on these circumstances surrounding the treatieH and placed ~Special emphasis on the government's promise that the resPrved landiS would never
become part of any State. !d., at 634-635. Neither the special historical
origino; of tla• Cho<:taw and Cherokee t n'al ie::; nor the crucial provi~ion::;
granting Indian land;; in fee simple and promi~Sing freedom from ~tate
jurbdiction in those treaties have any counterpartH in the term~ and cir-·
cumstanccs of the Crow TrPaties of 1851 and 1868.
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all its important fiduciary duties tow9rd the Crow Tribe, including those related to the river, without asserting a conveyance to the Tribe of title to the riverbed. 0
For these reasons, we conclude that title to the bed of the
Big Hom River pa1"sed to the State of Montana upon 1ts
admissiou into the Union, and that the Court of Appeals was
in error in holding otherwise.

III
Though the parties in this case have raised broad questions
about the power of the Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing
by non-Indians on the reservation, the regulatory issue before us is a narrow one. The Court of Appeals held that the
Tribe may prohibit non-members from hunting or fishing on
land beloDging to the Tribe or held by the United States in
trust for the Tribe, 604 F. 2d, at 1165-1166, and with this
holding we can readily agree. We also agree with the Court
of Appeals that if the Tribe permits non-members to fish
or huut on such lands, it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits. Ibid. What
remains is the question of the povver of the Tribe to regulate
non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in
fee by non-members of the Tribe. The Court of Appeals
held that, with respect to fee-patented lands, the Tribe may
regulate, but may not prohibit, hunting and fishing by nonmember resident owners or by those, such as tenants or employees, whose occupancy is authorized by the owners. Id.,
at 1169. The court further held that the Tribe may totally
prohibit hunting and fishing on lands within the reservation
owned by non-Indians who do not occupy that land. Ibid.
6 The Crows may navigate the river, Illino·is Y. Ill Cent . R. R . Co.,
146 U. S 387; 33 U. S. C. § 10, fish in it:> waters , Uwted States v.
Winans. 198 U.S. 371, dock out to navigable water, United States v. Holt
Stale Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 59, use water for irrigation, Winters v.
United States, 207 U S. 564, and own all valunble ;;itPs for power, Crow:·
Allotment. Act of June 4, HJ20, 41 Stat. 751 , ,[ 10.
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The Court of Appeals found two sources for this tribal
regulatory power: the Crow treaties, aaugrnented" by 18
U. S. C. § 1165, and "inherent" Indian sovereignty. We believe that neither source supports the court's conclusion.
A
The purposes of the 1851 Treaty were to assure safe passage for settlers across the lands of various Indian tribes; to
compensate the Tribes for the loss of buffalo, other game
animals, timber and forage; to delineate tribal boundaries;
to promote i11ter-tribal peace; and to establish a way of identifying Indians who committed depredations against nonIndians. As noted earlier, the Treaty did not even create
a reservation, although it did designate tribal lands. See
Crow Tribe v. United States, 284 F. 2d 361, 364, 866, 368
(Ct. CL). Only Article 5 of that Treaty referred to huuting
and fishing, and it merely provided that the 8 signatory
tribes "do not surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or
passing over any of the tracts of country heretofor·e de13cribed." 11 Stat. 749. 7 The Treaty nowhere suggested that
Congress intended to grant authority to the Crow Tribe to
regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on non-member lands. Indeed, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
after the Treaty was signed non-Indians, as well as members
of other Indians tribes, undoubtedly hunted and fished within
the treaty-designated territory of the Crows. 604 F. 2d, at
1167.
The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 649, reduced the
size of the Crow territory designated by the 1851 Treaty.
Article 2 of the Treaty established a reservation for the Crow
Tribe, and provided that it be 11set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupat-ion of the Indians herein named
and for such other friendly tribes or indivi<.lual Indians as
from time to time they may be willing, with the couseut of
the United States, to admit amongst them ... ," (emphasis
1

The complaint in

fi~hin~

on l'e~ervati.on

thi~

case did nol allege that non-Indian hunting and
lullds has impairt:>d lhi::. privilege.
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added) and that "the United States now solemnly agrees that
no persons, except those herein designated and authorized so
to do .• . shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon
or reside in the territory described in this article for the use
of said Indians. . . . " The treaty, therefore, obligated the
United States to prohibit most non-Indians from residing on
or passing through reservation lands used and occupied by
the Tribe, and, thereby, arguably conferred upon the Tribe
the authority to control fishing and hunting on those lands.s
But that authority could only extend to "land on which the
Tribe exercises "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation." And it is clear that the quantity of such land was
substantially reduced by the allotment and alienation of
tribal lands as a result of the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887, -24 Stat. 388, 25 U. S. C. § 331 el seq., and
the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751. 9 "If the 1868
Treaty created tribal power to ·restrict or prohibit nou-Indian
hunting and fishing on the reservation, that power cannot
apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians. 10
8 Article IV of the Treaty addressed hunting rights specifically. But
that Article refl:'rred only to "unoccupied lands of the United States,"
viz ., land~ outside the reservation boundaries, and is accordingly not relevant here.
9 The 1920 Crow Allotment Act. was one of the special allotment acts
Congress pas~ed from time to time pursuant to t.he policy underlying the
General Allotment Act. See S. Rep.' No.' 219, '66th Cong., lsi Se~;s., at 5
(1919). Th e Senate Committee Report on the Crow Allotment bill~>lHted
that it "i~; in accordance with the policy to whirh C'ongre~ gave it::; ad·hPreiH'e many year:; ago, and which found expre:::.~ion in the [General Allotment Act]." !d., at 5.
10 The Comt of Appeal~ dil:icussed the effc·ct of the Allotment Acts as
follows:
"While neither of the~e Actd, nor any other to whi('h our attention has
been callecl, rxplicitly quahfie~ the Tril.Je's right::; over hunting und fishing, it defies rea~:>on to suppose that Congre:s~; intended that non-members
who reside on fee patent lands cou ld hunt and fi::;h thereon only by consent of the Tribe. So f1H a;; the recor1l of this cnse reveals, no efforts to
exclude completely non-mPmber:> of the Crow Trii.Je from h11nting and
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In Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Garne Department, 433
U. S. 165 (Puyallup III), the relevant treaty included language virtually identical to that in the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie. The Puyallup Reservation was to be "set apart,
~:shing within the reservation were being made by the Crow Tribe at the
time of enactment of the Allotment Acts." 604 F. 2d, at 1168 (footnote
omitted).
But nothing in t.he Allotment Acts supports the view of the Court of
Appeals that the Tribe could nevertheless bar hunting and fishing by nonresident fee owners. The policy of the Acl~S was the eventual assimilation
of the Indian population, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S.
60, 72, and the "gradual extinction of Indian reservations and Indian
titles." Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 241, 246 . Tht> Secretnry of
the Interior and the Commis::;ioner of Indian Affair;; repeatedly rmphasized that the allotm<:>ni policy wns designed to eventually eliminate tribal
relat.ions. See, e. g., Report of the Secretary of the Interior (1885), pp.
25-28; Report. of the Secretary of the Interior (1886), p. 4; Report of
the Commissioner of Indians Affair::; ( 1887), pp. IV-X; Heport of the
Secretary of the Interior (1888), pp. XXIX-XXXII; Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1889), pp. 3-4; Report of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs (1890), pp. VI, XXXIX; Report of thr Commissioner
of Indian Affairs (1891), pp. 3-9, 26; RPport of the Commis;;ioner of
Indian Affairs (1892), p. 5; Report of the Secretary of the Interior
(1894), p. IV. And throughout. the Congrel:lsional clebatt>s on the subject
of allotment, it was assumed that the "civilization" of the Indian population was to be accomplii:ihed, in part, by the dio;:solution of tribal relation~. &t>, e. g., XI Cong. Rec. 779 (Srn. Ve::;t), 782 (Sen. Coke), 783-784
(Sen. Saunders), 85 (Senator::; Morgan ami Hour) , 881 (Sen . Brown), 90()
(Sen. Butler, 939 (Sen. Teller), 1003 (Sen. Morgnn), 1028 (Sen. Hoar),
(Sen. Butler), 939 (Sen. Teller), 100:~ (Be11. Morgan), 1028 (Sen. Hoar),
There is simply no suggestion in tlw legi~Siativp hi:story that Congre:ss
intended that the non-Indians who would settle upon alienated allotted
lands would be subject to tribal regulatory authority. lndc<>d, throughout
the Congrrssional debates, allotment of Indmn land was consistently
equated with the dis::;olution of tribal affairs and juri:;cliction . S<•c, e. g.,
XI Cong. Rec. 785 (Sen. Morgan), 875 (Sen . Hoar), 876 (Sen. :\Iorgan),
878 (Senator;; Hoar and Coke), 881 (Sen . Browll), 908 (Sen. Call), 939
(Sen . Teller), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 1067 (St>uators Edmuud::; and William~).
It defies common sense to suppose that Congr~s would iutPnd that nonIndians vurchasing allotted lands would become subjPct to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate ·
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and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their
exclusive use ... [and no] White man [was to] be permitted
to reside upon the same without permission of the tribe .... "
See id., at 174. The Puyallup Tribe argued that those words
amounted to a grant of authority to fish free of State interference. But this Court rejected that argument, finding, in
part, that it "cla.<She [ d] with the subsequent history of the
reservation ... ," ibid., notably two acts of Congress under
which the Puyallups alienated, in fee !?imple, the great majority of the lands in the reservation, including all the land
abutting the Puyallup River. Thus, "[n]either the Tribe
nor its members continue to hold Puyallup River fishing
grounds for their 'exclusive' use." Ibid. Puyallup II I indicates, therefore, that treaty rights with respect to reservation
lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of
those lands. Accordingly, the language of the 1868 Treaty
provides no support for tribal authority to regulate hunting
and fishing on land owned by non-Indians.
The Court of Appeals also held that the federal trespass
statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, somehow "augmented" the Tribe's
regulatory powers over non-Indian land. 604 F. 2d, at 1167.
If anything, however, that statute suggests the absence of
such authority, since Congress deliberately excluded fee-patented lands from the statute's scope. The statute provides:
Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully and knowingly goes upon any land that belongs
destruction of tribal government. And it ii:l hardly likely that Congress
rould have imagined that the purpose of peaceful as::;imilation could be
advanced if fee-holders could be excluded from fishing or hunting on their
acquireu property.
The poliry of allotment and sale of surplu;; reservation land was, of
com::;e, repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorgamzation Act, 48 Stat. 984
(c·urrenl version at 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq .) . But what i8 relevant in
this case is the effect of the land alienation occasioned by that policy on
Indian treaty rights tied to Indian use and occupation of re;;ervatlo:n
land.
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to any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or group and either
are held by the United States in trust or are subject to
a restriction against alienation imposed by the United
States, or upon any lands of the United States that are
reserved for Indian use, for the purpose of hunting,
trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the removal of game,
peltries, or fish therefrom shall be fined .. ,
The statute is thus limited to lands owned by Indians, held
in trust by the United States for Indians, or reserved for use
by Indians. 11 If Congress had wished to extend tribal jurisdiction to lands owned by non-Indians, it could easily have
done so by incorporating in § 1165 the definition of "Indian
tlountry" in 18 U. S. C. § 1151: "all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States government notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation." Indeed, a subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary proposed that this be done. But the Department of Interior recommended against doing so in a letter
dated May 23, 1958. The Department pointed out that a
previous congressional report, H. Rep. No. 2593, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess./ 2 had made clear that the bill contained no implica11 See United States v. Bouchard, 464 F . Supp. 1316, 1336 (WD Wis.);
United States v. Pollnan, 364 F. Supp. !}95 (Mont.).

12 House Report 2593 stated that the purpose of tl10 bill that became
18 U. S. C. § 1165 was to make it unlawful to enter Indian land to hunt,
trap, or fish without the consent of the individual Indian or tribe:
"Indian property owners should ha,ve the same protection as other property owners, [sic] , for example, a private hunting club may keep nonmembers oft' its game lands or it may issue a permit for a fee. One who
~omes on such lands without permission may be prosecuted under State
law but a non-Indii:tJ.l trespasser on an Indian reservation enjoys immunity.

Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of Indian court~ and canaot be tried in Indi11n courts on tre~pMs charges. FurthPr, Uwre are no
Federal laws which can be invoked against trespa.~,;ers." H . R. 2593 , 85tht
<;on~., 2d Se~s. (emphasis added) .

,-
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tion that it would apply to land other than that held or controlled by Indians or the United States. 18 The Committee
on the Judicia.ry then adopted the present language, which
does not reach fee-patented lands within the boundaries of
an Indian reservation.

IV
Beyond relying on the Crow Treaties and 18 U. S. C. § 1165
as source for the Tribe's power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation,
the Court of Appeals aiso identified that power as a•1 incident
of the inherent sovereignty of the Tribe over the entire Crow
reservation. United States v. Montana, supra, 604 F. 2d, at
1170. But ~<inherent sovereignty" is not so broad as to support the application of Resolution No. 74-05 to non-Indian
lands.
This Court most recently reviewed the principies of inherent sovereignty in United States v. Wheeier, 435 U. S. 313.
18 Subsequent reports in the House and Senate, H. Rep. 625, 86th Cong.,
ht Sess., S. Rep. 1686, 86th Cong., Zd Sess., alw refer to "Indian lands ';
and "Indian property owners" rather than "Indian country." In Oliphant, supra, this Court referred to S. Rep. 1685, w'hic'h stated that "the
legi~lation [28 U. S. C. § 1155J will give to the Indian tribes and to
individual Indian owners certain rights that now exist a~ to other~, and
Alls a gap iu the pre~nt law for the protection of their prope1·ty." 435
U. S., at 206. (Emphasis added.)
Before the Court of Appeal~ deci~ion, several other courts interpreted
§ 1165 to be confined to lands owned by Indians, or held in trust for their
benefit. State v. Baker, 464 F. Supp. 1377 (WD Wis.); United States v.
Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316 (WD Wis.); United States v. Pollman, 364
F. Supp. 995 (Mont.); Donahue v. California Justice Court, 93 Cal. App.
310. Cf. United Statl's v. Sanford, 547 F. 2d 1085, 1089 (CA9) (holding
that § 1165 wa~> designed to prevent encroachmPnt::; on Indian lands, rejE'cling the argument that § 1165 makes illegal the unauthorized killing
of wildlife on an Indian reservat.ion, and notin that "thE' applicatwn of
Montana game law8 to the activitiesr(10n-lndiaus on Indian re<'E'rvHtions
(!Qes .not interference with trilml ~elf-government on resE'rvation~).
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In that case, noting that Indian tribes are "unique aggrega~
tions possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory," id., at 323, the Court upheld
the power of a tribe to punish tribal members who violate
tribal criminal laws. But the Court was careful to note that,
through their original incorporation into the United States
as well as through specific treaties and statutes, the Indian
tribes have lost many of the attribute~ of sovereignty. !d.,
at 326. The Court distinguished between those inherent
powers retained by the tribes and those divested:
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving
the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers
of the tribe . ...
These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent
status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction
is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But the
powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws. are of a different type. They involve only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers as would
necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, in addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the
Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal
membership, to regulate domestic relat.ions among members,
and to prescribe :rules of inheritance for members. I d. , at
322, n . 18. But exercise of tribal power beyond what is
nece~ary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express Congressional delegation. .Mescalero Apache Trib e v. United States,
411 U. S. 145, 148; Williams v. L ee, 358 U. S. 217, 219- 220 ;
Unit ed States v. K ayarna, 118 U. S 375, 381- 382 ; see Me-·
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Clanahan v. Arizona State Tax Cornrn'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171.
Since regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of
a tribe on lands no longer owned by the Tribe bears no clear
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations, 14
the general principles of retained inherent sovereignty did
not authorize the Crow Tribe to adopt Resolution No. 74-05.
The Court recently applied these general principles in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Trt'be, 435 U. S. 191, rejecting
r. tribal claim of inherent sovereign authority to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Stressing that Indian
tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their dimiuished status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice Johnson 's
words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87the first Indian case to reach this Court-that the Ind1an
tribes have lost "any right of governing every person within
their limits except themselves." Id., at 147, Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra, 435 U. S., at 209. 'Though
Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in crim~
inal matters/b the principles on which it relied support the
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers
14

Any argument that Resolution No. 74-05 i& necessary tD Crow tribal
self-government is refuted by the findings of the District Court that the
State of Montana has traditionally exercised "near exclusive'' jurisdiction
over hunting and fishing on fee lands within the reservation, and that the
parties to this case had accommodated themselves to the ;,1:ate regulation.
United States v. Montana, supra, 457 F. Supp., at 610. The Court of
Appeals left these findings unaltered and indeed implictly reaffirn1f'd them,
adding that the record reveals no attempts by t.he Tribe at the time of the
Crow Allotment Act to forbid non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservation land!:i. United States v. Montana, s·upra, 604 F. 2d 1168 and n. lla.
15 By dt>nying the Suquamish Tribe criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians, however, the Oliphant ca::;e would seriously restrict the ability of
a tribe to enforce any purported regulation of non-Indian hunten; and
fishermen . Moreover, a. tribe would not be able to rely for enforcement
on the federal criminal trespa::;s statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, since that
l!tatute does not apply to fee patented lancfls See text and note& at 'PP·

- - - , 3-upra,
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of the tribe. 'l'o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some foq'ns of civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consen.sual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 223; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194
U. S. 384; Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 2d 947, 950 (CA8); see
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
U. S. - , - . A tribe may also retain inReservation, herent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
eonduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity or the property or economic security of the tribe.
See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 386; Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220; Montana Catholic Missions v. MisBoula County, 200 U. S. 118, 128-129; Thomas v. Gay, 169
U. S. 264, 273. 16
No such circumstances, however, are involved in this case.
N<m-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian fee land
do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe
150 as to subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And
nothing in this case suggests that such non-Indian hunting
and fishing so threatens the Tribe's political or economic setlurity as to justify tribal regulation. The complaint in the
District Court did not allege that non-Indian hunting and
fishing em fee lands imperils the subsistence or welfare of the
Tl"ibe.n Furthermore, the District Court made express find-

'•.

16

As a corollary, this Court has held that the Indian tribes retain
rights to river waters necessary to make their reservations economically
producti\'!e. Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564, 576.
17 Similarly, the com11laint did not allege that the State has abdicated or
abused its responsibility for protecting and managing wildlife or has establi:;hed its sPason, bag, or creel limits in such a way as to impair the
CliOW 'Indians) treaty rights to fish or hunt. cr. United St·ates v. Wash-

''
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ings, left unaltered by the Court of Appeals, that the Crow
Tribe has traditionally accommodated itself to the State's
"near exclusive" regulation of hunting and fishing on fee
lands within the reservation, Un:ited States v. Monta;na,
supra, 457 F. Supp., at 609-610. And the District Court
found that Montana's statutory and regulatory scheme does
not prevent the Crow Tribe from limiting or forbidding nonIndian hunting and fishing on lands still owned by or held in
trust for the Tribe or its me.mbers. l d., at 609.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, th$ judgment of the
Court of Appeals is set aside, and the case is remanded to
that court fol' further pl'oceedings,

lt is so ordered,

ington, 384 F. Snpp. 312, 410-411 (WD W11sh .), aff'd1 520 F. 2d 676
(CA9).
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

J

No. 79-1128 - Montana v. United States

Dear Potter:
In due course, ! ' shall attempt a dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 5, 1981

Re:

No. 79-1128 - State of Montana v. U.S.

Dear Potter:
I

await the dissent.
Sincerely,

?.f/4
T.M.

Justice Stewart
cc:

The Conference

lfp/ss
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79-1128 Montana v. United
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
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February 6, 1981

79-1128 Montana v . United States

Dear Potter:
I think your opinion in this case is excellent,
and will join it.
I may file a brief concurring statement along the
lines enclosed, although I believe by adding somewhat
similar language to your note 17 you could make clear that
state regulation must be nondiscriminatory. It is possible,
though unlikely, that sportsmen might persuade the state to
allow larger bag limits within an Indian reservation (where
game might be more plentiful) than the limits applicable
elsewhere.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss
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C HAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEV E NS

Fe bruary 11, 1981

Re:

79-1128 - Montana v. United States

Dear Potter:
Because I had some doubts about this case
at the time of Conference, I will await the dissent.
However, after reading your persuasive opinion, I
think I may well end up by joining you.
Respectfully,
( .\ J
r
~-);;,, __ /

.
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U.
.

1

Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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February 11, 1981
79-1128 Montana v. United States
Dear Potter:
I think your opinion in this case is excellent. I
do raise a couple of points that perhaps you can clarify by
relatively modest changes or additions.
First, is it not desirable to make clear that the
regulation of hunting and fishing must be nondiscriminatory.
It is possible, I suppose, that influential sportsmen might
persuade the state to allow larger bag limits within an
Indian reservation than the limits applicable at reasonably
comparable locations elsewhere.
I wonder also whether your opinion might be
construed as preventing a tribal government from enacting
nondiscriminatory land use or zoning laws that might
prohibit altogether hunting or the use of firearms. For
example, it is illegal, I believe, to fire even an air rifle
in the city limits of Richmond, Virginia. I am inclined to
think a tribe would be able to impose prohibitions of this
kind on all the residents of a reservation.
I have never been clear as to the extent of a
tribe's civil jurisdiction within a reservation with respect
to use of land owned by non-Indians. A tribe certainly
needs some powers to further its collective welfare, but on
some reservations a majority of the land is owned by nonIndians. I assume your opinion does not go beyond anything
we have said in the past with respect to a tribe's general
civil jurisdiction.
I expect to join your opinion, but would like to
know what you think about the foregoing.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss
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Sincerely,
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the sources and ~cope of the power of an
Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by nonJ ndians. Relying on its purported ownership of the bed of
the Big Horn River, on the treaties which created its reservation. and on its inherent power as a sovereign, the Crow Tribe
of Montana claims the authority to prohibit all hunting and
fishing by non-members of the Tribe on non-Indian property
within reservation boundaries. We granted certiorari, U. S. --. to review a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that substantially upheld this
claim.
JusTICE STEWART

][

The Crow Indians originated in Canada, but some three
centuries ago they migrated to what is now southern Montana. In the 19th century, warfare between the Crows and
several other tribes led the tribes and the United States to
sign the First Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851, 11 Stat. 749,
in which the signatory tribes acknowledged various designated lands as their respective territories. The treaty identified approximately 38.5 million acres as ·crow territory and,
in Article 5, specified that, by making the treaty, the tribes
did not "surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or pass-
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ing over" any of the lands in dispute. In 1f68, the Second
Treaty of Fort Laramie established a Crow reservation of
roughly 8 million acres, including land through which the
Big Horu River flows. 15 Stat. 649. By Article 2 of the
treaty, the United States agreed that the res-::rvation "shall
be set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the Crow Tribe, and that no non-Indians except
agents of the Government "shall ever be permitted to pass
over, settle upon, or reside in" the reservation.
Several subsequent Acts of Congre~s reduced the reservation to slightly fewer than 2.3 million acres. See 22 Stat. 42
(18f2); 26 Stat. 1039-40 ; 33 Stat. 352 (1904); 50 Stat. 884
(1937). In addition, the General Allotment Act of 1887. ch.
119, 24 Stat. 388, and th0 Crow Allotment Act of 1920. ch.
224. 41 Stat. 751, authorized the issuance of patents in fee
to individual Indian allottees within the reservation. Under
these Acts, an allottee could alienate his land to a non-Indian
after holding it for 25 years. Today, roughly 52 prrcent of
the reservation is allotted to members of the Tribe and held
by the United States in trust for them, 17 percent is held in
trust for the Tribe itself, and approximately 28 percent is
held in fee by non-Indians. The State of Montana owns in
fee simple 2 percent of the reservation . the United States
less than 1 percent.
Since the 1920's, the State of Montana has stocked the
waters of the reservation with fish, and the construction of a.
dam by the United States made trout fishing in the Big Horn
River possible. The reservation also contains game, some of
it stocked by the State. Since the 1950's, the Crow Tribal
Council has passed several resolutions respecting hunting and
fishing on the reservation, including Resolution No. 74-05, the
occasion for this lawsuit. That resolnt:on prohibits hunting
and fishing within the reservation by anyone who is not a
member of the Tribe. Tl'.e State of Montana, however, haS'
continued to assert its authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indi:~m within the reservf!tion .
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On October 9, 1975, proceeding in its own r:ght and as
fiduciary for the Tribe, the United States endeavored to resolve the conflict between the Tribe and the State by filing
the present lawsuit. The plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory
judgment quiet:ng title to the bed of the B:g Horn River in
the United States as trustee for the Tribe, (2) a declaratory
judgment establishing that the Tribe and the United States
have sole authority to regulate hunting and fishing within
the reservation, and (3) an ilijunction requ:ring Montana to
secure the permiss:on of the Tribe before issuing hunting or
fishing licen~es for use within the reservation.
The n:strict Court denied the relief sought. United States
v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599. In determining the ownership of the river, the court invoked the presumption that the
United States does not intend to divest itself of its sovereign
rights in navigable waters and reasoned that here, as · in
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, the language
and circumstances of the relevant treaties were insufficient
to rebut the presumption. The court thus concluded that
the bed and banks of the river had remained in the ownership of the United States until they passed to Montana on
its admission to the Union. As to the dispute over the regulation of hunting and fishing. the court found that "[ijmplicit in t]1e SuprPme Court's derision in Oliphant [v.
Suqua,rn-ish Indian Tnbe, 435 U. S. 191,] is the recognition
that Indian tribes do not have the power, nor do they have
the author:ty, to regniate non-Indians unless so granted by
an Act of Congress." 457 F. Suop.. at 609. Because no
treaty or Art of Congress gave the Tribe authority to regulate
hunting or fishing by non-Indians, the court held that the
Tribe could not exercise such authority except by granting or
withholding authority to trespass on tribal or Indian land.
All other authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing resided concurrently in the State of Montana and, under
18 U, S. C, § 1165 (which makes it a federal offense to tre.s ..
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pass on Indian land to hunt or fish without permission), the
United States.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court. 604 F. 2d 1162. Relying on its opinion in
United States v. Finch, 548 F. 2d 822, vacated on other
grounds, 433 U. S. 676, the appellate court held that, pursuant to the treaty of 1868. the bed and banks of the river
were held by the United States in trust for the Tribe. Relying on the treaties of 1851 and 1868, the court held that the
Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation by non-members, although the court noted that the
Tribe could not impose criminal sanctions on those nonmembers. The court also held, however, that the two Allotment Acts implicitly deprived the Tribe Of the authority to
prohibit hunting and fishing on fee lands by resident nonmember owners of those lands. Finally, the court held that
non-members permitted by the Tribe to hunt or fish within
the reservation remained subject to Montana's fish and game
laws.
II
The respondents seek to establish a substantial part of their
claim of power to control hunting and fishing on the reservation by asking us to recognize their title to the bed of the
Big Horn River. 1 The question is whether the United States
conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow
Tribe by the Treaties of 1851 or 1868, and therefore con1 According to the respondents, the Crow Tribe's interest. in restricting
hunting and fishing on the n~ervation focuses almost entirely on sports
fi:shing and duck huntiug in the water~ all(l on the surface of the Big Horn
River. The partiC'S, the Distriel Court, and the Court of Appeals have all
assumed that ownership of the riverbed will largt>ly dett>rmine the power
to coutrol the:;c a!'tivitil'~. 7\.Ior<>over, although 1hr complaint in thi:o;
ease ,;ought lo quiet. tith• only to tlw lwd of the Big Horn Hiver, we note
the con<•eo;.~iun of thr Unitc·d ~tate,; ihat if thr bed of tlw riwr pa~ed t<J
Montana upon it~ admi,;,;iou to the l'nion, thr 8tate aL the i:><lllle lim<!
acquireJ owner::;hip of the banks of the rivl'r a:- well.
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tinues to hold the land in trust for the use and benefit of the
Tribe, or whether the United States retained ownership of
the riverbed as public land which then passed to the State
of Montana upon its admission to the Union. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620, 627-628.
Though the owners of land riparian to non-navigable
streams may own the adjacent riverbed, conveyance by the
United States of land riparian to a navigable river carries no
interest in the riverbed. Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 672;
Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 289; 33 U.S. C.§ 10;
43 U. S. C. § 931. Rather, the ownership of land under navigable waters is an an incident of sovereignty. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 409-411. As a general principle, the Federal
Government holds such lands in trust for future States, to be
granted to such States when they enter the Union and assume
sovereignty on an "equal footing" with the established States.
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 212, 222-223, 229. After
a State enters the Union, title to the land is governed by state
law. The State's power over the beds of navigable waters
remains subject to only one limitation: the paramount power
of the United States to ensure that such waters remain free
to interstate and foreign commerce. United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 14. It is now established, however. that
Congress may sometimes convey lands below the high water
mark of a navigable water,
and so defeat the title of a new State, in order to perform international obligations, or to effect a.n improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience
of commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States, or to carry out other public purposes for which
the United States hold the Territory.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48. But because control
over the property underlying navigable waters is so strongly
identified with the sovereign power of government, United
Sta,tes v. Ore(J.On, supra, 295 U. S., at 14, it will not be held
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that the United States has conveyed such land "except because of some special duty or exigency." United States v.
Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55. See also Shively
v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48. A court deciding a ques·
tion of title to the bed of a navigable water must, therefore,
begin with a strong presumption against conveyance by the
United Rtates, United States v. Oregon, supra, 295 U.S., at 14,
and must not infer such a conveyance "unless the intention
was definitely declared or otherwise made plain," United
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55. or was
rendered "in clear and special words," Martin v. Waddell,
supra, 41 U. S., at 411, or "unless the claim confirmed in terms
embraces the land under the waters of the stream," Packer v.
Bird, supra, 137 U. S., at 672. 2
In United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, this Court applied these principles to reject an Indian tribe's claim of title
to the bed of a navigable lake. The lake lay wholly within
the boundaries of the Red Lake Indian reservation, which
had been created by treaties entered into before Minnesota
joined the Union. In these treaties the United States promised to "set apart and withheld from sale, for the use of" the
Chippewas. a large tract of land, Treaty of Sept. 30. 1854, 10
Stat. 1109, and to convey "a sufficient quantity of land for
the permanent homes" of the Indians, Treaty of Feb. 22,
1855, 10 Rtat. 1165. See Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S.
373, 389. 3 The Court concluded that there was nothing in
the treaties "which even approaches a grant of rights in lands
underlying navigable waters; nor anything evincing a purpose to depart from the established policy . . . of treating
such lands as held for the benefit of the future State."
Congress was, of coun;e, aware of this presumption once it wa~ eHtablbhed by thi::l Court. Sec Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip , -1:30 U. S. 584,
2

588
3 The Hitchcock clrrision exprrt>fily stutt•cl that the Red Lake re.:;ervation was " a re,;ervation within the accepted meaning of that term."
Minnesota v. llitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 389.
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United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 58-59.
Rather, " [fl he effect of what was done was to reserve in a
general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what
remained of their aboriginal territory." I d., at 58.
The Crow treaties in this case, like the Chippewa treaties
in Holt State Bank, fail to overcome the established presumption that the beds of navigable waters remain in trust
for future States and pass to the new States when they assume sovereignty. The 1851 treaty did not by its terms formally convey any land to the Indie.ns at all, but instead
chiefly represented a covenant among several tribes which
recognized specific boundaries for their respective territories.
Treaty of Fort Laramie, 1851, 11 Stat. 749, Art. 5. It referred to hunting and fishing only insofar as it said that the
Crow Indiahs "do not surrender the privilege of hunting,
fishing, or passing over any of the tracts of country heretofore described," a statement that had no bearing on ownership of the riverbed. By contrast, the 1868 treaty did expressly convey land to the Crow Tribe. Article 2 of the
treaty described the reservation land in detail 1 and stated
that such land would be "set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein
named .... " Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1968,
15 Stat. 649, Art. 2. The treaty then stated:
. . . the United States now solemnly agrees that no
persons, except those herein designated and authorized
to do so, and except such officers, agents, and employees
4 "[C]omnwucing where the 107th degree of longitude we:;t of Greenwich crol:lses the south boundary of Montana Territory; thence north
along :>aid 107th meridian to the mid-channel of the Yellow:;tone River;
thence up said mid-channrl of the Yellow:stone to the point. where it
crosses the said ~outhern boundary of 1\lontana, being the 45th degree of
north latitude ; and thence eai:it along said pamllel of latitude to the plac~r
of beginning . . .. " Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat.
M9, Art . 2.
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of the Government as may be authorized to enter upon
Indian reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by
law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon ,
or reside in the territory described in this article for the
use of said Indians . .. .
Ibid. Whatever property rights the language of the 1868
treaty created, however, its language is not strong enough to
overcome the presumption against the sovereign's conveyance
of the riverbed. The treaty in no way expressly referred to
the riverbed, Packer v. Bird, supra, 137 U. S., at 672, nor was
an intention to convey the riverbed expressed in "clear and
special words." Martin v. Waddell, supra, 41 U. S .. at 411,
or "definitely declared or otherwise made plain," United
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55. Rather,
as in Holt , ''the effect of what was done was to reserve in a
general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what
remained of their aboriginal territory." Ibid.
Though Article 2 gave the Crow Indians the sole right to
use and occupy the reserved land , anrl implicitly. the power
to exclude others from it, the respondents' reliance on that
provision simply begs the question of the precise extent of
the conveyed lands to which this exclusivity attaches. The
mere fact that the bed of a navigable water lies within the
boundaries described in the treaty does not make the riverbed
part of the conveyed land . especialiy when there is no express reference to the riverbed that might overcome the pr:-sumption against its conveyance. In the Court of Appeals'
Finch decision. on which recognition of the Crow Tribe's t:tle
to the riverbed rested in this case , that court construed the
language of exclusively in the 1868 treaty as granting to the
Indians all the lands, including the riverbed, within the described boundaries. United States v. Finch, supra, 548 F. 2d,
at 829. Such a construction, however, cannot survive examination . As the Court of Appeals recognized, ibid., ancf
as the respondents concede, the United States retains a navi-
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gational easement in the navigable waters lying within the
described boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless
of who owns the riverbed. Therefore, such phrases in the
1868 treaty as "absolute and undisttJrbed use and occupation" and "no persons except those designated herein ... shall
ever be permitted." whatever they seem to mean literally,
do not give the Indians the exclusive right to occupy all the
territory within the described boundaries. Thus, even if exelusivity were the same as ownership, the treaty language
establishing this "right of exclusivity'' could not have the
meaning that the Court of Appeals ascribed to it. 5
~ In one recent casf', Choctaw Nation v. 01:/ahoma, supra, this Court
did eon::;true a reservation grant as including the bed of a navigab 1e water,
and the respondents argue that this case reserr.bles Choctaw Nation more
than it re;:;rmbles the established line of rases to which Choctaw Nation
is a singular exception. But the finding of a conveyance of the riverbed
in Choctaw Nation was based on very peculiar circumstailces not present
in this case.
Tho:'ie circumstances aro::;e from the unusual history of the treaties there
ut i::;i:iue, a history which formed an important basil:! of the decision.
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, supra. 397 U. S , at 622-628. Immediately
aft~r the Revolutionary War, the Uniterl States had signed treaties of
peace and prott>ction with the Cherokee and Choctaw tribet:~, reserving
them land::; in Georgia and Mi:ssis~ ippi. In succeedi1~g year:s, the United
States bought largr areas of land from the Indiant:~ to makE' room for
white ~ett lert:~ who were encroaching on tribal lands, but the Government
signed new tre<ltiel:! guarantt'eing that the Indians could Jive in peace on
tho:se lands not ceded. The United States soon betrayed Uutt promise.
It propo::;ed that the tribes be relocated in a newly acquired pa.rt of the
Arkansas Territory, but the new territory was soon overrun by white settler:;, und thratigh a :series of new tes:;ion agreements the Indians were
forced to relocate fartht'r and farther west. Ultimately, mo:st of the
tribet:~' member~ refused to leave their eastern lands , doubting the reliability of the government's promises of the new western land, but Georgia
and Mis:sissippi, a11xiout:~ for the reloration westward so they could a~:;sert
juri::;dirtion over the Indian lands, purportecl to abolish the tribet:~ and
distribute the tribal lands. The Choctaws and Cherokee:> finally signed
new treatit's with the United Sta~s aimed at rectifying their past suff~r,
ing at the hands of the Federal Government and the States.

.
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Moreover, even though the establishment of an Indian
tribe can be an ((appropriate public purpose" within the
meaning of Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48, justifying a congressional conveyance of a riverbed, see, e. g.,
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 218 U. S., 85, the
situation of the Crow Indians at the time of the treaties
presented no "public ex'gency" which would have required
Congress to depart from its policy of reserving o ~ship of
beds under navigable waters for the future States. See
Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at. 48. As the record in
this case shows. at the time of the treaty the Crows were a
nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on buffalo, and fishing was
not important to their diet or way of life. JA 74. Cf.,
Alaska Padfic Fisheries v. United States, supra, at 88; Skolcomish Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F. 2d 295, 212 (CA9).
For these reasons, we conclude that. title to the bed of the
Big Horn River pa!"sed to the State of Montana upon its
admission into the Union. and that the Court of Appeals was
in error in holding otherwise.
Under the Choctaw treaty, the United States promised to convey new
lands west. of the Arkansas territory in fee simple , and also pledged that
"no Territory or government shall ever have :1 right to pa<-':5 laws for the
government of the Choctaw Nat ion . . . and that no part of the land
grantee! to them shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State." Treaty
of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept . 17, 1830, 7 Stat. 333-334, quoted in
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, supra, 397 U. S., at 625. In 1835, the
Cherokres signed a treaty containing ;:;imilar provisions granting reoervation lands in fee simple and promising that the tribal lands would not
become part of any State or Territory . Iil., at 626. In concluding that
the United States had intended to convey the riverbed to the tribes before the admission of Oklahoma to the Union, the Choctaw court relied
on these circumstances surrounding the treaties and placed special emphasis on the govemment's promise that the reserved lands would never
becomP part of any State. !d., at 634-635. Neither the special historical
origins of the Choctaw and Cherokee treaties nor the crucial provi~ioi1S'
granting Indian lands in fee simple and promising freedom from state
jurisdiction in those treaties have any counterparts in the terms and ciremnstanccs of the Crow Treaties of 1851 and 1868.
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III
Though the parties in this case have raised broad qt!estions
about the power of the Tr.ibe to regulate hunting and fishing
by non-Indians on the reservation, the regulatory issue before us is a narrow one. The Court of Appeals held that the
Tribe may prohibit non-members from hunting or fishing on
land belonging to the Tr.ibe or held by the United States in
trust for the Tribe, 604 F . 2d, at 1165- 1166, and with this
holding we can readily agree. We also agree with the Court
of Appeals that if the Tribe permits non-members to fish
or hunt on such ·lands, it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits. Ibid. What
remains is the question of the power of the Tribe to regulate
non-Indian fishing and hu11ting on reservation land owned in
fee by non-members of the Tribe. The Court of Appeals
held that, with respect to fee-patented lands. the Tribe may
regulate, but may not prohibit, hunting and fishing by nonmember resident owners or by those, such as tenants or employees, whose occupancy is authorized by the owners. I d.,
at 1169. The court further held that the Tribe may totally
prohibit hunting and fishing on lands within the reservation
owned by non-Indians who do not occupy that land. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals foulld two sources for this tribal
regulatory power: the Crow treatief>, "augmented" by 18
U. S. C. § 1165, and "inherent" I1idian· sovereignty. we· believe that neither source supports the court's conclusion .
.A

The purposes of the 1851 Treaty were to assure safe pas-·
sage for settlers across the lands of various Indian tribes; to
compensate the · Tribes for the loss of buffalo, other game
animals, timber and forage ; to delineate tribal boundaries;
to promote inter-tribal peace ; and to establish a way of identifying Indians who committed depredations against nonIndians. As noted earlier, the Treaty did not even create
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a reservation, although it did designate tribal lands. See
Crow Tribe v. United States, 284 F. 2d 361, 364, 366, 368
(Ct. Cl.). Only Article 5 of that Treaty referred to hunting
and fishing, and it merely provided that the 8 signatory
tribes "do not surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or
passing over any of the tracts of country heretofore deBcribed." 11 Stat. 749. 6 The Treaty nowhere suggested that
Congress intended to grant authority to the Crow Tribe to
regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on non-member lands. Indeed, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
after the Treaty was signed non-Indians, as well as members
of other Indians tribes, undoubtedly hunted and fished within
the treaty-designated territory of the Crows. 604 F. 2d, at
1167.
The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 649, reduced the
Bize of the Crow territory designated by the 1851 Treaty.
Article 2 of the Treaty established a reservation for the Crow
Tribe, and provided that it be "set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation oi the Indians herein named
and for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as
from time to time they may be willing, with the consent of
the United States, to admit amongst them ... ," (emphasis
added) and that "the United States now solemnly agrees that
no persons, except those herein designated and authorized so·
to do ... shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon
or reside in the territory described in this article for the use·
of said Indians. . . ." The treaty , therefore, obligated the·
United States to prohibit most non-Indians from residing on
or passing through reservation lands used and occupied by
the Tribe, and, thereby, arguably conferred upon the Tribe·
the authority to control fishing and huuting on those lands. 7
6

The complaint in this case did not allege that non-Indian hunting and
fishing on reservation lands ha::; impaired this privilege.
1 Article IV of the Treaty addm.;::;ed hunting right::; specifically.
But
that Atticle referred only to " unoccupied lands of the United Stutes,w
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But that authority could only extend to land on which the
Tribe exercises "absolute anti undisturbed use and occupa~
tion." And it is clear that the quantity of such land was
substantially reduced by the allotment and alienation of
tribal lands as a result of the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq., and
the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751. 8 If the 1868
Treaty created tribal power to restrict or prohibit non-Indian
hunting and fishing on the reservation, that power cannot
apply to lands held in fee by non-1ndians. 0
viz., lands outside the reservation boundaries, and is accordingly not relevant here.
8 The 1920 Crow Allotment Act wa. one of the speeial allotment aetl:i
Congretil:i passed from time to time pursuant to t-he policy underlying the
General Allotment Act. See S. Rep. No. '219, "66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5
(1919). The Senate Committee "Report ·on the Crow Allotment bill stated
that it "is in accordance with the policy to which Congress gave its adherence many years a-go, and which found expression in the [General Al.
lotment. Actj ." fil., at 5.
9 The Court of Appeals discu:;~:;ed the effect of the Allotment Act~; as
follows:
"While neither of t.hese Acts, nor any other to which our attention has
been called, explicitly qualifie:; the Tribe's rights over hunting and fish.
ing, it. defies reason to suppose that Congres:; intended that non-members
who reside on fee patent lands could hunt anrl fish thereon only by consent of the Tribe. ·so far as the record of this case reveals, no efforts to
exclude completely non-members of the Crow Tribe from hunting and
fishing within the reservation were being made by the Crow Tribe at the
time of enactment of the Allotment Acts." 604 F . 2d, at 1168 (footnote
omitted).
But nothing in the Allotment Acts supports the view of the Court of
Appeals that the Tribe could nevertheless bar hunting and fishing by nonresident fee owners. The policy of the Acts was the eventual assimilation
of the Indian population, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S.
60, 72, and the 1 'gradual extinction of Indian reservations and Indian
titles." Draper v. Un·ited States, 164 U. S. 241, 246. The Secretary of
the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs repeatedly emphasized that the allotment policy was designed to eventually eliminate tribal
reiationfi. See, e. g., Report of the Secretary of the Interior (1885), PP-
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In Puuallup Tn'be v. Washington Garne Department, 433
U. S. 165 (Puyallup III), the relevant treaty included language virtually identical to that in the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie. The Puyallup Reservation was to be "set apart,
and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their
25-28: Rrport of the Secretary of the Interior ( 1886), p. 4; Report of
the Commi~~ioner of Indians Affair~ ( 1 87), pp. IV-X; Report of the
Secretary of the Interior ( 1888), pp. XXIX-XXXII; Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1889), pp. 3-4; Report of the Commi:;sionrr
of Indian Affairs ( 1890), pp. VI, XXXIX; Report of the Commis::;ioner
of Indian Affairs (1891), pp. 3-9, 26; Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs (1892), p. 5; Report of thP Secretary of th() Interior
( 1894), p. IV. An·d throughout the Congressional debates on the subject
of allotment, it was assumed that the "civilization" of the Indian popu1ation was to be accomplished, in part, by the dissolution of tribal relations. See, e. g., XI Cong. Tit><'. 779 (Sen. Vest), 782 (Sen. Coke), 783-784
(Sen. Saunders), 85 (Senators Morgan and Hoar), 881 (Sen. Brown), 900
(Sen. Butler, 939 (Sen. Teller), 1003 (Sen. Morgan), 1028 (Sen. Hoar),
(Sen. Butler), 939 (Sen. Tellrr), 1003 (:Sen Morgan), 1028 (Sen. Hoar),
There i:s simply no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress
intended that the non-Indian:; who would settle upon alienatt>d nllottro
lands would be subject to tribal regulatory authority. Inde~d, throughout
the Congressional debates, allotment of Indian land wal:i consistently
equated with the dis:solution of tribal affairs and juri:sdiction. See, e. g.,
XI Cong. Rec. 785 (Sen. Morgan), 875 (Sen. Hoar), 876 (Sen. Morgan),
878 (Senators Hoar and Coke), 881 (Sen. Brown), 908 (Sen. Call), 939
(Sen. Teller), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 1067 (Senators Edmunds and Williams).
It defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that nonIndians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal juri::;diction when an avowPd purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate
destruction of tribal government. And it is hilrdly likely that Congress
could have imagined that the purpose of peaceful a~similation could be
advanced if feP-holder~ could be excluded from fi~hing or hunting on their
acquired property.
The policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation land was, of
course, repudiatPd in 19:~4 by thr Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Sta.t. 984
(current vPrsion at 25 U. S. C. § 4(il et l!eq.). But what is relevant irr
this rase i~ thr effect of the land aliPnation occasioned by that policy on
Indian treaty rights tird to Indian use and occupation of reservation

land.
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exclusive use ... [and no] White man rwas tol be permitted
to reside upon the same without permission of the tribe .... "
See id. , at 174. The Puyallup Tribe argued tha.t those words
amounted to a grant of authority to fish free of State interference. But this Court rejected that argument, finding, in
part, that it "clashe[d] with the subsequent history of the
reservation ... ," ibid., notably two acts of Congress under
which the Puyallups alienated, in fee l:limple, the great majority of the lands in the reservation , including all the land
abutting the Puyallup River. Thus, "[n]either the Tribe
nor its members continue to hold Puya1lup River fishing
grounds for their 'exclusive' use." Ibid. Puyallup I I I indicates, therefore, that treaty rights with respect to reservation
lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of
those lands. Accordingly, the language of the 1868 Treaty
provides no support for tribal authority to regulate hunting
and fishing on land owned by non-Indians.
The Court of Appeals also held that the federal trespass
statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, somehow "augmented" the Tribe's
regulatory powers over non-Indian land. 604 F. 2d, at 1167.
If anything, however, that statute suggests the absence of
such authority, since Congress deliberately excluded fee-patented lands from the statute's scope. The statute provides:
Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully and knowingly goes upon any land that belongs
to any Indian or Indian tribe, band , or group and either
are held by the United States in trust or are subject to
a restriction against alienation imposed by the United
States, or upon any lands of the United States that are
reserved for Indian use, for the purpose of hunting,
trapping, or fishing thereon , or for the removal of game,
pe1tries, or fish therefrom shall be fined . ..
The statute is thus limited to lands owned by Indians, held
in trust by t he United States for Indians, or reserved for use-

T9-1128-0PINIO~

16

MONTANA v. UNITED STATES

by Inclians.10 If Cgngres had wished to extend tribal juris-:
~iction to lands owned by non-Indians, it could easily have
.done so by incorporating in § 1165 the definition of "Indian
country" in 18 1]. S. C. ·§ 1151{ ·"all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States government notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way -running through the reservation." Indeed, a subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary proposed that this be done. But the Department of Interior recommended against doing so in a letter
dated May 23, 1958. The Department pointed out that a
previous congressional report, H. Rep. No. 2593, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., 11 had made dear that the bill contained no implication that it would apply to land other than that held or controlled by Indians or the United States. 12 The Committee
10 Sec United States "· Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1836 (WD Wis.);
United States v. Pollnan, 364 F . Supp. 995 (Mont.).
11 Hou:se Hcport 25H:~ stated that the purpose of the bill tha.t became
18 U. S. C. § 1165 was to make it unlawful to enter Indian land to hunt,
trap, or fish without the consent of the individual Indian or tribe:
"Indian property owners should have the same protection as other property owners, [sic], for example, a private hunting club may keep nonmembers off its game lands or it may issue a permit for a fee . One who
comes on such lands without permission may be prosecuted under State
law but a non-Indian trespasser on an Indian reservation enjoys immunity.

Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and cannot be tried in Indian courts on trer:;pai:i:> charges. Further, there are no
Federal law:s which can be invoked against trcspa!lser:s." H . R. 2593, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess , (emphasis added) .
1
~ Snb::wquent report~ in the Hons<' and S<:>nat!:', H, Hep. 6:Z5, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., S. Rep . 1686, 86th Cong., 2d Se.ss., also refer to "Indian lands"
and "Indian property ownens" rather than "Indian country." In Oliphant, supra, this Court refenecl to S. Rep . 1686, which stated that "the
legislation [28 U. S. C . § 1165] will give to the Indian tribes and to
individual Indian owners certain rights that now exist as to others, and
fills a. gap in the preseut law for the protectiou of their property." 435
U. S., at 206. (Emphas is added .)
Before the Court of Appeals decision , several other courts interpreted
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on the Judiciary then adopted the present language, which
does not reach fee-patented lands within the boundaries of
an Indian reservation.

IV
Beyond relying on the Crow Treaties and 18 U.S. C. § 1165
as source for the Tribe's power to regulate non-Indian hunt~
ing and fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation,
the Court of Appeals also identified that power as an incident
of the inherent sovereignty of the Tribe over the entire Crow
reservation . Un·ited States v. Montana, supra, 604 F. 2d, at
1170. But "inherent sovereignty" is not so broad as to support the application of Resolution No. 74-05 to non-Indian
lands.
This Court most recently reviewed the principles of inherent sovereignty in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313.
In that case, noting that 1ndian tribes are "unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory;'' id., at 323, the Court upheld
the power of a tribe to punish tribal members who violate
tribal criminal laws. But the Court was careful to note that,
through their original incorporation into the United States
as well as through specific treaties and statutes, the Indian
tribes have lost many of the attributee of sovereignty. !d.,
at 326. The Court distinguished between those inherent
powers retained by the tribes and those divested:
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sover§ 1165 to be confined to lands ownt>d by Iudians , or held in trust for their
benefit. State v. Baker, 464 F . Supp. 1377 (WD Wis .); United States v.
Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316 (WD Wis.); United States v. Pollman, 364
F . Supp. 9H5 (Mont .); Donahue v. California Justice Court, 93 Cal. App.
310. Cf. United States v. Sanford, 547 F . 2d 1085, 1089 (CA9) (holding·
that § 1165 wa:; designed I o prevPnt encroachmpnt:; on Indian land:;, rejPcting the argument that § 1165 makes illegal tlw unauthorized killing
of wildJifp 011 an Indian reservation, and noting that "thP application of
1\Iontana gnme law:; to the artivitif's of non-Indian;: on Indian re:;ervation "
dQ<.-'::l not interference with trih~d ~t>lf-government on reservation:; ) .

.
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eignty has been held to have occurred are those involving
the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers
of the tribe . ...
These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent
status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction
is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But the
powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve O'lily the relations among members of a tribe. ·Thus, they are not such powers as would
necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, in addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the
Illdian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal
membership, to regulate domestic relat.ions among members,
and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. !d., at
322, n. 18. But exercise of tribal power beyond what is
nece:ssary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express Congressional delegation. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. United States,
411 U.S. 145, 148; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-220;
United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S 375, 381-382; see McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171.
Since regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of
a tribe on lands no longer owned by the -Tribe bears no clear
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relatiolls/ 3
13 Any argument that He:;olution No. 74-05 ii:i nece::;:;ary to Crow tribal
self-government is refuted by the findings of the Di!:ltrict Court that the
State of Montana ha s traditionally exercised "near exclusive" jurisdiction
o,·er hunting and fi:;hing on fee lands within the reservation, and that the
parties to thi:; case had accommodated themselves to the state regulation.
United States v. Montana, SUJJ1'a, 457 F. Supp., at 610. The Court of
Appeals. left these findings unaltered and indeed implictly reaffirmed them,
adding that the record reveals no attempts by the Tribe at the time of the-
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the general principles of retained inherent sovereignty did
not authorize the Crow Tribe to adopt Resolution No. 74-05.
The Court recently applied these general principles in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, rejecting
p, tribal claim of inherent sovereign authority to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Stressing that Indian
tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their diminished status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice Johnson's
words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87tho first Indian case to reach this Court--that the Indian
tribes have lost "any right of governing every person within
their limits except themselves." !d., at 147, Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra, 435 U. S., at 209. Though
Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, 14 the priuciples 011 which it relied support the
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmember!!
of the tribe. To be sure, Indian tribes reta.in inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases. or other arrangements.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194
U. S. 384; Buster Y. Wright, 135 F. 2d 947, 950 (CAS); see
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Crow Allotment Act to forbid non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservaiion lands. United States v. Montana. supra, 604 F. 2d 1168 and n. lla.
11
By denying the Suquami::;h Tribe criminal jurbdiction over nonIndians, however, the Oliphant case would seriously restrict the ability of
a tribe to rnforce any purported regulation of non-Indian hunters and
fi::;hrrnwn . 1\!orrover, a tribe would not be able to rely for enforcement,
on the federal criminal trespass sta.tute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, since that
statute does not apply to fee patented lands. See text and notes at PP~

---,supra,
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Reservation,- U.S.-,-. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reserva.tion when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the politicay
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 386;
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. ·217, 220; Montana Catholic Mis
sions v. Missou.la ·county, 200 U. S. 118, 128-129; Thomas v.
Gay, 169 V. S. 264, .273.1[;
No such circumstances, however, are involved in this case.
Non-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian fee land
do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe
so as to suhject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And
nothing in this case suggests that such non-Indian hunting
and fishing so threatens the ·Tribe's political or economic security as to justify tribal regulation. The complaint in the
District Court did not a.Ilege that non-Indian hunting and
fishing on fee lands imperils the subsistence or welfare of the
Tribe.w Furthermore, the District Court made express fiud-·
ings, left unaltered by the Court of Appeals, that the Crow
Tribe has traditionally accommodated itself to the State's
"near exclusive" regulation of hunting and fishing on fee
lands within the reservation. United States v. Montana,
supra, 457 F. Supp., at 609-610. And the District Court
found that Montana's statutory and regulatory scheme does
not prevent the Crow Tribe from limiting or forbidding nonJG As a eorollary, this Court has held that the Indian tribes retain \
right,; to ri:er ~at;~;> nece~ry to makr their reHervations livable. Arizona v. Cahjorwa, 81v U. S. 545, 599.
1 6 Similarly, the complaint did not allege that the State has abdicated or
abus?d its re~pon~ibJity for protecting and managing wildlife, ha~ established its season, bag, or creel limits in such a way as to impair the
Crow Indians' treaty rightH to fi::;h or hunt, or has impo~ed less stringent
hunting and Fi;:hing regulation~ within the re~:;ervation than in other parts
of the Statr. Cf. United State~ v. Washington , 384 F. Supp. 312, 410-41I

fWD Wa:.-;h .) , aff'd, 5:20 F. 2d 576 (CA9) .
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:Indian hunting a11d fishing on la11ds still ow11ecl by or held in
trust for the Tribt-) or its members. !d .. at 609.
For t,hc reasons stated in this opinion , the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is set aside, and the case is remanded to
that court for further proeeec!iugs.

1t is so ordered.
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